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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ENGINEERING COMMISSION, D. 
H. WHITTENBURG, Chairman, H. 
J. CORLEISSEN and LAYTON 
MAXFIELD, Members of the Engi-
neering Commission, 
Plaintiff a-nd Appellant, 
vs. 
FRED TEDESCO and KLEA B. TED-
ESCO, his wife, et al, Defendants, 
and 
BIRD & EVANS, INC. 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 7939 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT 
BIRD & EVANS, INC. 
INTRODUCTION 
·This matter comes before the Court on an intermediate 
appeal granted .to the State of Utah after a jury had been 
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chosen and the presentation of evidence had begun in the 
courfbelow. The questions to be determined by this Court are: 
_ 1. Does the respondent, Bird & Evans, Inc., have a legal 
remedy for the damages which it has suffered and which are 
the subject of this action; and 
2. Has the respondent, Bird & Evans, Inc., proceeded 
properly to secu~e legal redress for these damages. 
STATEMENT ·oF FACT 
The statement of fact as presented by the appellant is 
· a_ccurat~ so far as it pertains to the quotation of the statutes 
condemning or directing the condemnation of the land for 
C<This is' the Place" Monument 
The appellant fails; however, to mention in its Statement 
of Facts the interesting history of legislation concerning "This 
is the Place'' Mo~ument in t~e Second _Special Session of the 
Twenty-Ninth Legislature jn June of 1952. Th~se facts arc 
important as they bear upon the intention of the Legislature 
in regard to the condemnation of Kennedy Drive. 
H. B. No. 3 of the Second Special Session provided 111 
Section 1 thereof: 
''The action taken by the Engineering Con1tnissiOil 
in condemning the land in the vicinity of ''This is the 
Place" monument for state park purposes pursuant to 
the provisions of Chapter 75, La\vs of Ut~h. 1951. as 
amended my Chapter 13, Laws of Utah, 1951. First 
Special Session, and more particularly, its action in not 
-1 
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condemning public utility easements and that portion 
of Kennedy Drive embraced within the limits of the 
park area is approved and ratified.* 
When H.B. No. 3 came before the House of Representa-
tives on the third reading, Section 1 above quoted \Vas by 
amendment deleted from the Bill in its entirety and the re-
maining Sections renumbered accordingly. (Page 20, Journal 
of the I-Iouse of Representatives Second Special Session 
of ihe. T\venty-Ninth Legislature.) 
Immediately thereafter H.B. No.· 3 'vas withdra\vn and 
H.B. No. 5 was substituted in its place. H.B. No. 5 contained 
all of the salient points of H.B. No. 3 except the reference 
· 'to Kennedy Drive. It even grants to the State' Engineering 
Con1mission authority to grant easements across the coi1den1ned 
property for public utilities which provision had been stricken 
from H.B. ·No. 3 along with the reference to Kennedy Drive. 
H.B. No. 5 was thereupon passed by the Legislature, signed 
by the Governor, and became a statute of the State of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THIS ACT IS NOT BARRED BY THE PROVISIONS 
OF RULE 13 (a), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
* Actually Kennedy Drive was condemned, because the descrip-
tion contained in the Legislative Act, in the Resolution of the 
Engineering Commission, and in the Complaint filed, included 
Kennedy Drive and made no exception therefor. 
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The appellant makes the contention that the action of Bird 
& Evans, Inc., for damage to the upper property is cut off be-
cause of the fact that Bird.& Evans, Inc., did not file its counter-
claim or cross-complaint alleging damages to the property 
prior to the time the hearing of the court was had fixing the 
valu~ of the property specifically described in the Complaint. 
The respondent does not feel that this position is \\·ell taken. 
The Compulsory. Counter-Claim Rule has t\vo fundamental 
bases~ First to conserve the time of the court by handling in 
· a single hearing as many issues as can properly be handled, and 
Second so that if there are justified off-setting claims bern'een 
the same parties, these claims can be set-off one against the 
other to result in a lower single judgment rather than in two 
separate judgments r:unning in different directions bet\vecn the 
t\vo parties. Neither of these reasons is applicable here. Al-
though there is only one law suit bearing a single number 
covering all lands involved in the ctThis is the Place 11onument" 
action, because of the fact that the issues as to the various par-
cels were so diversified and would be so confusing to a single 
jury, the court has conducted numerous hearings under the 
same case, grouping the matters that had the greatest points 
in common in a single hearing. Even if the counter-claitn haJ 
been on file and at issue at the time of the hearing assessin.~ 
the value of the first piece of property, it would not have been 
heard by the court at that time because of the fact that the 
issues were so different; and, as indicated above the segregation 
by the judge of this case into various trials, was a segregation 
as to issues, rather than as to parties defendant. The titne t~f 
the court therefore would not have been conserved at all by 
the procedure suggested by the appellant. 
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The second reason for the. compulsory counter-claim rule 
is equally inapplicable here. There are not and could not be 
two judgments running in different directions between the 
parties to this action. Although the State is designated as party 
plaintiff in a condemnation action, the judgment actually runs 
in favor of the defendants. In this case, therefore, if two judg-
n1ents were rendered, one as to the value of the land actually 
taken and one for damages to the land not taken, both judg-
ments 'vould run against the State and in favor of Bird & 
Evans, Inc. There could, therefore, be no off-set. 
The attention of the court is further called to the fact 
that this cross-complaint was filed in the same action and before 
the action had been disposed of. At the time the Bird & Evans, 
Inc., cross-complaint or counter-claim was filed, although a 
hearing had been had as to the value of the Bird & Evans, 
Inc., property actually taken, (which property was neither 
adjacent to nor in close proximity to Kennedy Drive or to 
the property of the respondent involved in these proceedings 
and which was damaged by the condemnation of Kennedy 
Drive) there were many hearings yet to be conducted in the 
same case. The case was, therefore, very much alive and the 
counter-claim is filed in the same case as that originally brought 
by the State. 
This situation is clearly covered by sub-section (e) of 
Rule 13, which states: 
CCWhen a pleader fails to set up a counter-claitn 
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, 
or when justice requires, he may by leave of court set 
up the counter-claim by amendn1ent." 
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Certainly in this case the interests of justice required filing 
of the counter-claim, as without the counter-clairn it may \vell 
have been that under the case of Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 241 
Pac. ( 2d) 907, Bird & Evans, Inc. might have had no remedy 
except to petition the Board of Examin~rs, which n1atter \viii 
· be discussed later in this brief. Clearly it appears therefore, 
that the matter of setting up counterclaims by amendment in 
the same action before the action had been finally tenninated, 
is within the discretion of the trial court. The trial court per-
mitted such a filing in this case and proceeded to trial thereon, 
as it clearly had the right to do under the rule quoted above. 
POINT TWO 
. THE STATUTE AND THE FILING OF Tl-IE CO~f­
.PLAINT CONSTITUTE .~.\. CONDEMNATION OF KEN-
NEDY DRIVE. 
(a) The language of the. statttte clearly indicates Jll(b in-
tent 0!2 the part of the Legislature. 
The attention of the court is called to the fact that the 
Act of the Legislature, as amended by the First Special Session 
of 1951, leaves no discretion \vithin the Road Comn1ission as 
to whether or not it shall condemn certain lands described 
therein. The Commission is directed to proceed to conJemn the 
described lands which include Kennedy Drive, and is given 
discretion as to certain other lands. Pursuant to this mandate 
the Engineering Con1mission did file a cotnpL1int in its con-
detnnation of the mandatory lands not excluding the ref ron1 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Kennedy Drive. The court did not rule, as the appellant has 
n1aintained, that the Legislature· s Act in itself constituted a 
condemnation. Although respondent feels that such a ruling 
\vould have been justified, the court held that" the enactment 
of the statute plus the resolution of the engineering commis-
sion and the filing of the con1plaint constituted the act of 
conden1nation. This is clearly indicat~d by certain language 
of the court \vhich has been entirely omitted from the State-
ment of Fact of the appellant. The language of the court 
in making its ruling is found at page 91 of the record and 
reads as follo\vs: 
"1;Ir. Rampton: "We would like the Court to take judi-
cial notice of the act of the Legislature and to take notice of 
the resolution of the Road Commission, which is pleaded in 
full in the complaint and, based upon that, to make an order 
to the effect that the lands embraced therein, including Ken-
nedy Dricve, have been condemned." * * * 
"The Court: The order as indicated by !vfr. Rampton \vill 
be granted." 
It may be conceded that as a general rule the Legislative 
Act in and of itself is not an act of condemnation because as 
a usual thing no specific land is· described in the statute, put 
a considerable discretion is left to the administrative agency 
charged v.rith the taking of the property. As pointed out abo\re, 
such is not the case here. The administrative. agency \vas di-
rected to condemn certain described land. In this regard the 
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((The mere passage of legislation authorizing the 
acquisition of property by eminent domain is . ordi-
narily not sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute a 
taking. Where, however, the provisions of the statute 
and the circumstances under which the appropriation 
is to· take place are such as to indicate that the purpose 
of the law ·was to effect a taking by virtue of the 
statute itself, it has been held that a statute mav be 
so construed as to vest title in fhe condeniner t;pon 
the mere passage of the law." 
In Lewis on" Eminent.Domain at page 375 it is stated: 
••.It is competent for the legislature to appropriate 
property directly by an act duly passed, instead of con-
fering authority to do so, and this has occasionally been 
done." · 
The attention of the court is called to the fact that the 
property in . this ca~e had been acquired by the land owner 
for the purpose of sub-dividing for sale as residen.tial property 
and indeed at the time. of t~1e condemnation the property 
had been platted and the owner was proceeding with sub-
division work. The minute the act in question was passed the 
land became worthless as sub-division lots. No person intending 
. to. build a house would buy a lot where the only access road 
to the lot was encompassed in land which the Legislature. 
by a statute, had directed to be taken for public park purposes. 
Granted the land still had some value. A sub-division specu-
lator might· still buy the land at· some price in the hope that 
access to the area would some day be made possible through 
the opening of Kennedy Drive or other streets into the area. 
Ho\vever, without question, the value of the land for sale as 
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The same question arose in the case of Chelten Trust Co. 
v. Blankenburg, Pa., 88 Atl. 664. There a city ordinance· de-
clared that a certain tract of land had be·en selected and ap-
propriated for park purposes. In holding that the act of the 
City Council in effect amounted to a taking, the court stated: 
nAppellees' land was practically taken and appro-
priated by the ity of Philadelphia, the day the ordi- . 
nance was passed ... The land cannot be built upon 
or improved except at the hazard of the improver and 
it is \vorthless for sale." 
Another case almost directly in point with the case no\v 
before the court is the case of People ex rel Canavan y. Collis, 
46 N.Y. Supp. 727. There the Legislat~re adopted a certain 
statute regarding certain described lands and declared them 
to be a public parkway' and required the municipal authorities 
of the City of New York at once, in the manner described in the 
act, to condemn the property and have the value appraised. 
The court pointed out that this New York Statute, as in the 
case of the Utah statute now before this court,. provided a 
complete scheme for the condemnation of the property and 
the payment to owners. The court stated: 
((Fron1 the time of the passage of the Act and cer· 
tainly · from the time when the lands therein \vere 
located by the filing of the n1ap, they were fully ap-
propriated an.d set apart for public u~e, and the duty 
of taking proceedings to appraise their value arose ... 
The law gave to the municipal authorities of the C~ty 
of New York no locus poenitentiae, or right to dis-
continue the proceedings, but the statute tnade it 
obligatory upon them not only to take the proceedings 
for condemnation, but to pursue them to a final report. 
11 
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The case is not one where it lay in the discretion of 
the Commissioner of Public Works or the Department 
of Public Works whether or not to take the land, or 
whether or not to continue proceedings \vhich had once 
begun for the condemnation of land; but the takin~ 
of this land was the act of the legislature, and th~ 
absolute duty of having it appraised was imposed upon 
the city, without any right or power to discontinue it. 
The rights of the parties, so far as the taking of the 
land is concerned, were fixed by the statute." 
To like effect see 1tlcMormock v. City of Brooklyn. 14 NE 
848, and Mott et al v. Eno, 74 N.E. 229. 
The appellant has cited the. United States Supreme Court 
case of Danforth v. United- States, 308 U.S. 271; 84 L. Ed. 
240, 246 and 247; 60S. Ct. 231, to the effect that a legislative 
act does not constitute condemnation. An examination of this 
case will definitely indicate that it is not in point. The court 
states: 
nThe mere enactment of legislation which tllttborizcJ 
a condemnation of property cannot be a taking.·· 
In this case, however, we do not have an act authorizing con-
demnation, we have a statute directing it. In his dissenting 
opinion in the case of Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard 
Min. Co., 196 U.S. 239, 25 S. Ct. 251, 258; 49 L.Ed. 462, quoted 
vvith approval of Judge Wolfe in the case of State v. District 
Court, Fourth Judicial District, 78 Pac. ( 2d) 502, Justice 
Holn1es stated: 
"The fundamental fact is that en1inent dotnain is 
a prerogative of the state, which, on the one hat~d tnay 
be exercised in any \vay that the state thinks ht. and 
on the other n1ay not be exercised except by an authority 
12 
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which the state confers. The taking rnay be direct, by 
an act of the LegiJiature ... " 
The appellant also contends that it was never the intention 
of the Legislature to condemn Kennedy Drive. While no one 
can say for sure what was in the minds ·of various legislators, 
the only assumption to be drawn from the language of the 
legislators \vas that such \vas their intention. Kennedy Drive 
is definitely encompassed within the tract of land described. 
The Engineering Commission is directed, without the exercise 
of any discretion on its part, to proceed to condemn such land. 
Furthermore, as has been pointed out above, the Engineering 
Commission made an effort to have Kennedy Drive deleted 
from the description of the property. This provision was em-
braced in a bill introduced in the Legislature, which bill con-
tained a number of other provisions affecting the Monun1ent 
property. The bill was finally passed substantially as intro-
duced, except that the provision exempting Kennedy Drive from 
the provisions of the condemnation statute was . stricken by 
amendment. Certainly this shows an affirmative intention on 
the part of the Legislature that Kennedy Drive should not be 
excepted. 
Generally, it may be said that the land encompassed \Vithin 
the description contained in the· statute falls into three cate-
gories so far as ownership is concerned. 
(a) That land belonging to private owners which 
certainly the Legislature intended to condemn and 
'Nhich the State has proceeded to take and pay for. 
(b) The land across which ran Stat~ Road No. 65, 
'\vhich already belonged to the State and \vhich there 
13 
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would be no purpose in condemning as the State could 
already do whatever it wished with the land; and 
(c) The city and county streets encompassed within 
the area, including Kennedy Drive. 
As pointed out above, the argument that if the Legislature 
intended to condemn Kennedy Drive it also intended to con-
demn State Road No. 65 is without force or effect whatsoever. 
Why would the State proceed to condemn land which already 
belonged to it? If it did i~tend to proceed with the conden1-
riation, what effect would it have? The answer is obvious -
none whatever. If the State wanted to devote the land cur-
rently used· for highway purposes for park purposes, it could 
do so without an act of condemnation, although by so doing 
it might subject itself to some liability, but certainly a con-
demnation action was not necessary. 
In regard to the city and county streets, however, if the 
Sta.te was to acquire title, a .condemnation action was necessary 
as· the title was vestecl elsewhere. It was obviously the intention 
of the State to acquire a large ~ract of land for park purposes. 
1~he land, prior to the condemnation act, consisted of indivi-
dual building lots plus numerous streets serving such lots for 
residential purposes. Obviously no park could be built on an 
area cut up by such streets. An examination of the n1ap attached 
to appellant's Brief will show that in addition to Kennedy 
Drive, lands belonging to the city or county were lands travers-
ed by Oakhills Drive, Crest\vood Drive, Oak\vood Drive, Oak-
wood Circle and a number of other streets not sho\v n on that 
plat. What is there to indicate that the Legislature had any 
different intention toward Kennedy Drive than it had toward 
1 l 
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Crest\\'ood Drive or Oakhills Drive? The O\vnership of all 
these lands _,vas in a party other than the State. They had all 
been dedicated to the county by the same instrument. All o~ 
them provided possible access to land lying east of the Monu-
ment property. If the Legislature did not intend to condemn 
these road,vays, then it did not intend to condemn a continuous 
area for park purposes, but rather it intended to take a number 
of small disconnected pieces. Such can obviot~sly not be the. 
case. Whether or not the Legislature realized that by condemn-
ing these county or c;:ity roads it might be cutting off property 
o\vners to the· east from their property, we cannot kno,v, but 
certainly it could not have intended that such roadways be 
exempted frqm the condemnation suit, otherwise, as pointed 
out above, it v1ould not have the continuous area for park pur-
poses that was obviously desired. 
As a further evidence of the legislative intent, \Ve call 
attention to the_ fact that the primary act directing the taking 
of the properties for {{This is the Place', Monument park, 
passed by the general session of the Legislature in 1952 and 
\vhich included the area comprising Kennedy Drive in the 
description of the land to be taken, stated that one of the pur-
poses of taking the property was to. preserve nt~e natural 
beauty of the area surrounding,, the monutnent. The Legisla-
ture subsequently authorized the Engineering Commission to 
sell and remove from the area the beautiful and expensive 
homes which had been erected thereon. The inference to be 
drawn from this is a legislaitve intent to elin1inate improve-
tnents of every nature which had been· placed upon this prop-
erty, including roads placed thereon. This conclusion. is in-
escapable in vie·w of the fact that, as. pointed out. above, the 
15 
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question of excepting Kenndey Drive from the land to be 
condemned was expressly called to the attention of the Legis-
lature and it declined to make such an exception. 
(b) The Legislative Act and the Resolution of the Road 
Co1nnzission Established the Necessity for Taking. 
The appellant raises the point that there had never been 
a ·determination that the use of the land for park purposes 
was a higher use than for use as a public way. Likewise that 
there has never been a determination by the court as such that 
the establishment of the park was in the public interest. 
In support of this position appellant cites the case of To,vn 
of Perry v. Thomas, 22 Pac. (2d) 343, ignoring entirely the 
fact that the Court there held that the resolution of the Road 
Commission, in the absence of fraud, is conclusive evidence 
of. the necessity of taking. The language of the Court is as 
follows: 
((Under powers thus delegated. to n1unicipal boards 
the necessity, expediency, or propriety of opening a 
public street or way is a political question, and in the 
absence of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion the 
action of such board will not be disturbed by the 
courts. 10 R.C.L. 183, 184; 4 McQuillin or Municipal 
Corporations (2d Ed.) 367; 20 C.J. 559, 627, 972~ 
Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Oregon S.L.R. Co., 23 lJtah, 
474, 65 P. 73·5, 90 Am. St. Rep. 705; City of Grafton 
v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 16 N.D. 313, 113 N. W. 
598, 22 L.R.A. (NS) 1, and notes; City of Los Angeles 
v Waldron, 65 Cal. 283, 3 P. 890; City of Seattle v. 
Byers, 54 Wash. 518, 103 P. 791; Grangeville Hi~h­
\vay Dist. v. Ailshie, 49 Idaho, 603, 290 P. 717." 
16 
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In this very action the Attorney General's office, acting 
for the State of Utah, has proceeded to condemn extensive 
tracts of land, introducing no other evidence as to the necessity 
of the taking than the statute and resolution of the Road Con1-
mission itself. It is now trying to blow hot and cold in the 
same case. In fact, it has switched its position on this very 
point since the case was argued before Judge Van Cott. There, 
\\·hen the matter came up as to whether or not the resolution 
and the statute were evidence of the necessity for taking, Mr. 
Quentin Alston, representing the State, said: 
"I think the resolution presents a prima facie case, 
Your Honor." (P. 84 Transcript). 
If the resolution supported by the staute made a prima facie 
case as to the other pieces of land embraced within the con-
demnation action, certainly it made a prima facie case as to 
all lands embraced therein, and whether or not the legislative 
act itself was a condemnation, certainly based upon such reso-
lution, the court had the power to enter an order of copdem-
nation, which it did. 
In this regard the following language 1s found at 2 
Nichols on Eminent Domain,· page 908: 
"It is equally obvious that ·as there is no fixed prin-
cipal which decides what public improvements shall be 
undertaken and where they shall be lo~ated, these 
questions must be settled by some department of the 
Governn1ent. It does not, however, follo\v merely be-
cause such questions are often open to doubt and be-
cause evidence and argument might be of assistance 
in coming to a decision, that they are necessarily judicial 
17 
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and must be passed upon by the courts. Just as it is ex-
clusively in the power of the Legislature except so 
far as it is limited by the provisions of the constitution 
to provide what police regulations shall be enacted, 
what ·taxes shall be levied and what the duties of the 
various public officers shall be, so it is \Vithin the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the same body to determine 
what public improvements shall be constructed, where 
they shall be located and where the power of eminent 
domain shall be employed at acquire the necessary title. 
Where the Legislature authorizes the exercise of en;i-
nent domain in a particular case, it is necessttrily ad-
judicated· that the land to be taken is needed for tbe 
. public ttse and no other· or further adjudicctfion is 
necessary." 
As further answer to appellant's argument in this regard, 
\Ve point out the fact that Sec. 78-34-4 ( 3) relied upon by 
appellant is but a statutory provision covering the procedure 
for the taking of property under ·the general condemnation 
laws of the state, and cannot control these proceedings \vhich 
are based upon special acts of the Legislature. In fact, if there 
is any conflict between that section and the special acts direct-
ing the taking of the lands affected by these proceedings, the 
provisions of Sec. 78-34-4. (3) must yield to the later and 
specific statutes directing the condemnation of the property 
for CCThis is the Place" Monument park. 
POINT THREE 
RESPONDENT HAS PURSUED ITS PROPER RElv1-
EDY TO OBTAIN REDRESS FOR ITS DAMAGES. 
18 
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The appellant did not maintain in the Court below, nor 
did it n1aintain in its brief to this court that, if the respondent's 
right of access to its property is actually interferred with by 
the condemnation action, there has not been a taking or dam-
aging V\'ithin the contemplation of Article 1, Section 22 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. That the respondent has 
been damaged is quite clear. It is true that up to the present time 
Kennedy Drive has not been physically ·closed, and that all 
persons have been permitted, to drive over it. This, however, 
has been a pennissive thing, the right of respondents and 
others to use said street having been taken from them by the 
taking of the property described in the Complaint in this action. 
As has been pointed out abov~, Birds & Evans, Inc., 
\vere proceeding to sub-divide these lots for sale as sub-division 
property. As such, and if served by _a city street, . they had a 
very substantial value for residential purposes. Hov;ever, as 
quickly as the right of access was taken away and access re-
mained purely on a. permissive basis, the lots had no value at 
all for residential purposes. 
Let us suppose that a prospective purchaser wished to buy 
a lot for construcing a home, which lot was entirely surrounded 
by property belonging to another individual. Let us further 
suppose that with a right of \vay across the lands of the other 
individual, the prospective buyer was wiiling to pay $10,000.00 
for the residential lot. Let us suppose further that rather than 
granting a right of way across his other property, the property 
O\\'ner rnerely said, ('I will give you permission to go across my 
property to get to your lot, such permission to be revocable 
by me at any time. I may never revoke it and so you \Yill prob-
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ably always have access., Under such circumstances no person 
would buy such a lot for residential· use as he would not feel 
safe in constructing a house on it. This is the situation in re-
gard to the Bird & Evans, Inc., property. Prior to the con-
demnation action, the land had a certain value for residential 
purposes, while after the right of access became in doubt, it 
had no value for such purposes except a speculative value. 
Certainly we would not be entitled to a judgment for the value 
of· the land as would be the case if the land were actually 
taken, because we still have the land and it still has some value. 
Access up the side of the mountain could be had to it for the 
purpose of grazing goats, and it would have some value for 
this purpose. Furthermore, it is probable that a person wishing 
to buy it for speculation for residential purposes would pay 
some figure more than a pasture land value on it in _the hope 
that sometime in the future Kennedy ~rive would be reopened 
or that streets would b~ opened into it from sotne other source. 
The measure of our damages is the difference between 
\vhat a willing buyer would pay for the tract for its highest 
and best use before the condemnation action and \vhat he \vould 
pay for it after the condemnation action. Nor have our damages 
been nullified or our right taken away by the fact that the 
last session of the Legislature did in fact reopen Kennedy Drive. 
As a legal proposition this makes no difference. The following 
language is found at Vol. 18 of American Jurisprudence, Stc. 
280: 
"The right to damages becomes perfect \vhen the 
street is vacated, and cannot be diminished by any ac-
tion which the plaintiff may, in the future, take for 
the purpose of mitigating the injuries done to hin1. as. 
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for exan1ple, by his subsequent! y opening streets on 
his "land by means of \vhich access and egress to and 
from they may be had." 
This matter was before the Supreme Court of Washington 
in the case of Fry v. O'Leary, 252 Pac. 111, where the court 
held that \vhen a street was vacated, the right of the O\vner to 
damag~s became vested and the fact that other access was later 
acquired n1ade no difference. 
As a practical matter we still have suffered severe dan1ages. 
We have suffered the damage o.f being delayed two" years in 
the development of the sub-division. Our money has been tied 
up in the 1and for this period of time and it may be that the 
evidence will show a diminution in value of residential prop-
erty over that period of time. 
Taking then the proposition that v.;e have been damaged 
within the contemplation of the constitution, the last question 
arises as to whether we have taken the proper legal steps for 
the redress of these damages. This court has recognized in 
the cases of State v. District Cour~, Fourth Judicial Dist., 
78 P. (2d) 502 and the case of Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 241 
P. (2d) 907, the 4octrine of the non-suability of the sovereign. 
While counsel feels that this is an outmoded doctrine held 
over from the theory of the divine right of kings, nevertheless, 
it appears to be well established in our law. It tnay further 
\vell be the law as set forth by Judge Wolfe in his dissenting 
opinion in State v. District Court, Fourth Judicial Dist. 78 
P. (2d) 502, that the mere fact that the constitution gives 
a right of action in cases of property not taken, does not in1ply 
a consent of the state to be sued and that in many cases the 
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only remedy for the injured party is by appeal to the Board of 
Examiners. 
However, equally well established with the doctrine of 
the non-suability of the sovereign is the doctrine that when 
the sovereign itself invokes the jurisdiction of the court, it 
. becames subject to the jurisdiction of the court in all matters 
properly cognizable by the court in such an action~ The sove-
reign cannot use the court as a sword to obtain its rights and 
then in the same matter retire behind the shield of sovereign 
immunity when it wishes to escape the consequence of its 
original invocation of the court's jurisdiction. Here the state 
did invoke the jurisdiction of the court to aid it in its con-
den1nation of the property concerned. Had Bird & Evans, 
Inc., not been a party defendant to the original action, they had 
a statutory right to intervene in the action to get redress for 
any damages they sustained from the action. Section 78-34-7, 
U.C.A., 1953, provides: 
ctAll persons in occupation of, or having or claiming 
an interest in, any of the property described in the 
complaint, or in the damages for the taking thereof, 
though not named, may appear, plead an.d defend, each 
in respect to his own property or interest, or that claim-
ed by him, in. the same manner as if narned in the 
complaint." 
In this case, however, Bird & Evans, Inc. were already 
parties to the suit and intervention was not necessary. They 
sought relief by means of a counterclaim or cross-complaint, 
whichever term is proper to apply to the pleading. 
Sec. 78-34-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953·, contemplates 
having the court award damages against the state in con-
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demnation actions for datnages to property, no part of which 
is taken. Only \vhere the state has not invoked the jurisdiction 
of the court, as was true in the case of State v. District Court, 
Fourth Judicial District, 78 Pac. ( 2d) 502, or in cases where 
the injured parties have not by a timely action, had their 
damages a~sessed in the condemnation action, as was the case 
of Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 241 Pac.. (2d) 907, does the appeal 
to the Board of Examiners become the exclusive remedy. T'he 
statutory section above cited provides: 
(<The Court, jury or referee must hear such legal evi-: 
dence as may be offered by any of the parties to the 
proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess: 
( 1) The value of the property sought to be conden1n-
ed and all improvements thereon appertaining to the 
realty, and of each and every separate estate or interest 
therein; and if it consists of different parcels, the value 
of each parcel and of each estate or. interest therein 
shall be separate! y assessed. 
( 2) If the property sought to be condernned consti-
tutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages which 
will acrue to the portion not sought to be condernned 
by reason of its severance frotn the portion sought to 
be condemned and the construction of the improve-
ment in the manner proposed by the plaintiff. 
( 3) If the property, though no part thereof is taken, 
will be da1naged by the construction of the proposed 
i1npruuenzent. the anzount of such danzages ..... 
Attention of the court is called to the fact that this sec-
tion is not pern1issive, but mandatory. It states: ((The Court, 
jury or referee nutJt hear such evidence as may be ~ffered by 
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ascertain and assess" the compensation and damages .. To \vhat 
else could sub-section ( 3) of the above quoted statute apply 
than to a case like that now before the court? It is certain 
that the. State itself "rould never set up in its complaint in a 
conden1nation action that it was injuring .property, no part 
of which was taken. As has been very clearly pointed out by 
Judge Wolfe in his dissenting opinion in State v. District 
Court, Fourth Judicial District, 78 Pac. ( 2d) 502, neither 
the State nor the co~rt could know with certainty what indivi-
duals n1ight be damaged where no part of their property was 
.being taken. Therefore, if sub-section ( 3) is to have any ap-
plication at all, it must apply to those cases where the O\vners 
of the property, by appropriate pleading, have brought before 
the court the fact that they have been damaged. This the re-
spondent has done in this case. It has set up a counter-
clain1 or cross-complaint right in the condemnation action 
itself. The State has invoked the jurisdiction of the court. The 
statute provides for the redress of the damages by the court 
to the owners of the property injured, but not taken. Certainly, 
therefore, we are properly before the court and need not rely 
upon the Board of Examiners for redress of our in juries. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent feels and urges upon the court that the 
act of the Legislature in this case in itself constituted a taking 
of Kennedy Drive and· a damaging of its property. If the legis-
lative act standing alone did not do that, then certainly the 
Jegislative act, plus the filing of the action \VOu}d have that 
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effect. If the court will not go this far, then certainly it cannot 
be doubted that the legislative act, plus the filing of the action, 
plus the order of the district court o·rdering conden1nation in 
compliance with the mandate of the Legislature and the reso-
lution of the Engineering Commission, constituted such con-
demnation. If it did not accomplish that in regard to Kennedy 
Drive, then it did not accomplish it in regard to any of the 
lands and the State has not properly taken any of the _property 
for the monument site. It is true that in this case the defendants 
rather than the State urged upon the court the entry of the · 
order of condemnation on the basis of the statute and the 
resolution. This, hov1ever, was done not to create a cause of 
action, but because it was felt by counsel that this offered the 
only method of securing judicial redress for an injury already 
done. 
The respondent has suffered substantial damage as a re-
sult of the condemnation of ·the monument property. They 
have applied for redress in a case in which. the State itself 
has invoked the jurisdiction of the court. It is submitted that 
the action of the lower court should be sustained and the 
lower court should be permitted to proceed with the assess-
ment of the respondent's damages under the prov1s1ons of 
Sub-section (3) of 78-34-10, U.C.A., 1953. 
Respec_tfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMP'TON 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent, Bird & Ev?tns, Inc. 
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